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ABSTRACT
Networked, transnational forms of violence pose a significant 
threat to peace and security in a number of sub-Saharan African 
countries. In recent years, Kenya has witnessed an expanding 
number of attacks involving Al-Shabaab – the Somali-based militant 
organisation. Kenya’s state responses to these attacks derive from a 
social construction of Somalis as a threatening presence, justifying 
a raft of hard security measures. However, this targeting has been 
counter-productive by driving a deeper wedge between Somalis, 
other Muslims and the state, and levels of Al-Shabaab violence have 
remained high. Seen from the social and political margins that Kenya’s 
Somali and Muslim populations occupy, recent violence continues 
a long-standing dynamic of insecurity in which the state itself is a 
central actor. Internal stress relating to state-led planning of social 
order built on unequal citizenships and the use of violence, enmesh 
with the external threat of Al-Shabaab, producing the conditions for 
insurgency and violence to spread. Reducing violence and building 
peace require greater understanding of how violence and security 
are seen and experienced at the margins.
Introduction
The growing prominence of networked, transnational forms of violence and militancy, par-
ticularly across the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, has raised the profile of the margins as areas 
contributing to larger situations of instability. Viewed through the lens of state security, and seen 
from the perspective of the state, networked transnational violence happening at the margins 
represents a potential source of instability affecting whole states and regions. Viewed from the 
margins, however, this violence may appear very different, as something reflecting a longitudinal 
dynamic of state–society relations, enmeshed in local politics and society, and inseparable from 
earlier experiences of violence and legacies of conflict. Seen from the perspective of vernacular 
understandings of security at the margins, recent violence is less a new phenomenon than it is 
the continuation of long-standing situations of violent insecurity.
The tensions engendered by different ways of ‘seeing’, and hence, responding to violence 
are evident in worsening violence in Kenya linked to Al-Shabaab, the Somalia-based militant 
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organisation. Kenya has witnessed an expanding number of attacks since 2008, when vio-
lence involving Al-Shabaab accounted for less than 2% of all recorded violence events. By 
2011, Al-Shabaab was implicated in over one quarter of all recorded incidences of violence. 
Kenya’s security institutions have responded to worsening violence as something that con-
stitutes an ‘external stress’ and threat to Kenya’s peace and security. In 2011, it launched a 
military operation in neighbouring southern Somalia, ostensibly to establish a buffer against 
Al-Shabaab attacks. Further, it instigated police swoops in majority-Somali neighbourhoods, 
tightened administrative controls of refugee populations, passed new security laws and gave 
wide leeway to the Anti-Terrorism Policing Unit (ATPU) that is tasked with identifying and 
detaining terror suspects. These responses derive from a discourse and understanding that 
‘sees’ outsiders, namely Somalis and Muslims, as a threat, both internally and with regard 
to conflict spillovers from Somalia.
Yet, far from curbing Al-Shabaab violence, attacks have multiplied, ranging from the 
September 2013 siege of Nairobi’s Westgate shopping centre, to village massacres, to the 
targeted killings of police and religious figures, to the Garissa University College attack 
in April 2015 – Kenya’s deadliest since the 1998, Al Qaeda bombing of the Nairobi US. 
Embassy. Whilst Kenya’s political and security establishments consider Al-Shabaab to be a 
type of new external stress that can be contained and defeated, seen from the margins, recent 
violence marks the continuation of a long-standing conflict dynamic, intimately connected 
to Kenya’s own political history – including its complex relationships with Somalia – and 
one in which the state itself has been a central actor.
This article considers the nature and dynamics of recent, networked, transnational forms 
of violence affecting ‘the margins’. These describe not only remote, rural areas. In Kenya, 
because of deep divisions, insurgent margins exist in other places and interstices existing 
within wider society and politics, showing how marginality is experienced socially and 
politically. The case of Al-Shabaab attacks and state security responses that target Kenya’s 
Somali and Muslim populations is developed to critically review the ‘external stresses’ fram-
ing that is widely used by governments and multilateral institutions as a way to understand 
and thus address recent Islamist violence in sub-Saharan Africa. The counter-productive 
outcomes of Kenya’s state security responses to Al-Shabaab attacks – likened to ‘killing 
a mosquito with a hammer’ by some – reveal the group’s effectiveness at exploiting the 
country’s longstanding internal tensions, marginalisation and use of state violence against 
Somalis. This enmeshing of Al-Shabaab with legacies of unequal citizenship rights and 
adverse state security responses raises the risk of violence and poses the need for different 
peacebuilding responses that pay heed to security in the vernacular.
The article is based on historical as well as qualitative analysis, including interviews car-
ried out in Kenya in June and July 2014 with journalists, human rights officials and other 
civil society actors, security and counter-terrorism analysts, foreign diplomats and local 
researchers. Some of these represented state perspectives whilst others were part of or closely 
aligned with Kenyan Somali and Muslim populations. National and international print and 
online media were used to help construct state security discourses, as well.
The next section details the external stresses framing that Kenyan state security actors 
have used to explain and respond to worsening violence that involves Al-Shabaab. Section 
three provides a deeper context of the state’s security and political relations with Somali 
society over time, which provides a framing to understand recent trends in violence and 
the home-grown threat that are detailed in section four. Kenya’s state security responses 
are discussed in section five before the article concludes.
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Networked violence and external stresses
A growing number of works seek to understand the role of ‘external stresses’ in situations of 
violence and political instability. The World Development Report 2011 (WDR) gives exam-
ples including military invasion, external support for domestic rebels, cross-border conflict 
spillovers, international terrorism and criminal networks, price shocks and the impacts 
of climate change. It posits that the risk of conflict and violence arises from these stresses 
interacting with ‘internal stresses’, such as low income levels, youth unemployment, corrup-
tion and human rights abuses. Mitigating the negative effects of external stresses, it holds, 
requires building ‘buffering institutions’ at the national level in the affected countries – to 
enhance capabilities for coping with stress – and enhancing cooperation with their regional 
neighbours: ‘Countries and subnational areas with the weakest institutional legitimacy and 
governance are the most vulnerable to violence and instability and the least able to respond 
to internal and external stresses’.1
A weakness in this approach is its underlying premise that ‘internal’ and ‘external’ stresses 
are somehow separate and distinct. However, Schultze-Kraft shows that the issue is not 
merely that internal and external stresses combine to generate stress but that they ‘actually 
relate to and reinforce one another, for they are interconnected through transnational actors 
and processes’.2 Further, states are not only overwhelmed by these transnational dynamics; 
rather, they actively shape these, as well: ‘powerful political and military elites and their 
patronage-dependent constituencies are actively engaging in processes of … globalization, 
seeking to appropriate rents to maintain positions of power and influence through patron-
age and clientelism’.3 He shows that interrelated internal, external and transnational actors 
drive these processes, which can promote the interests of state and non-state groups both 
within and outside the country that is thought to be stressed.
This enmeshing is evident in Kenya, where inequalities in citizenship for the country’s 
Somali populations, as well as Muslims, has historical roots and has been part of the state for-
mation process leading up to contemporary state security responses to Al-Shabaab attacks. 
Seen from the perspective of Kenya’s political and security establishments, the country’s 
peace and security are undermined by external stress arising from spillovers from Somalia’s 
long-running conflict. This builds on a pedigree of thinking and practice within Kenya’s 
security institutions that regards Somalis, in particular, whether from Somalia, or Kenyan 
Somalis, acting as part of or through transnational terrorist networks, as ‘outside’ threats to 
peace and security. Take for example comments by John Sawe, Kenya’s former ambassador 
to Israel, following the bombing in 2002 by militants of the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala 
and attempt to shoot down an Israeli commercial plane, ‘There is no doubt in my mind 
that al-Qa’eda is behind this attack, because we have no domestic problems, no terrorism 
in our country, and we have no problem with our neighbours, no problem whatsoever’.4 
Announcing an eminent security crackdown in Nairobi’s Eastleigh neighbourhood in 2011 
to flush out suspected Al-Shabaab members, then Assistant Internal Security Minister Orwa 
Ojode remarked, ‘This is a big animal with its head in Eastleigh, Nairobi and its tail in 
1World bank, ‘World development Report 2011: conflict, Security, and development’. (Washington, dc: international bank 
for Reconstruction and development/The World bank, 2011): 7.
2Markus Schultze-Kraft, ‘external Stresses’ and Violence Mitigation in Fragile contexts: Setting the Stage for Policy analysis’, 
addressing and Mitigating Violence (brighton: idS, October 2013): 8.
3Schultze-Kraft op. cit.
4anneli botha, ‘Radicalisation in Kenya Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican council’ (Pretoria: institute 
of Security Studies, 2014): 3.
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Somalia’.5 Strongly derided by Kenya’s Somali leaders and politicians at the time, Ojode’s 
comments were widely publicised in Kenya because they so transparently revealed the optic 
informing Kenya’s approach to reducing the spread of violent insecurity.
This approach distances the terror problem, favouring security, policing and legal meas-
ures that target ‘outside’ forces that are thought to spread violence. Critically, it underplays 
home grown radicalisation,6 thereby missing the intricacies of how transnational actors 
like Al-Shabaab reinforce and entwine with ‘internal’ tensions and situations. Following 
a spate of kidnappings of aid workers and tourists, in October 2011, 1500 Kenya Defence 
Forces personnel crossed the border into parts of southern Somalia, marking the beginning 
of a military campaign dubbed Operation Linda Nchi, or ‘Protect the Nation’. Explaining 
Kenya’s right to defend itself under international law, Internal Security Minister at the 
time, George Saitoti, emphasised, ‘Kenya has been and remains an island of peace, and we 
shall not allow criminals from Somalia, which has been fighting for over two decades, to 
destabilise our peace. The kidnappers in Lamu who sneaked in and ran away must not be 
given a chance again’.7 The official justification of the operation built on a securitisation of 
the steady increase in numbers of Somali refugees in Kenya from the 1990s onwards. The 
perception of risk evolved around localised insecurity issues across the porous border, 
poaching and the illegal trade in arms. Perceptions of threat were also influenced by the 
Global War on Terror launched in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks.8 Somali 
refugees became the ‘local and regional epitome of contemporary global terrorism’.9 From 
2006, a new wave of refugees to Kenya followed US-backed military action by Ethiopian 
proxy forces against the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia.10 The Kenyan government 
responded by shutting the border in 2007 due to increased insecurity in the area and fear 
that ICU fighters might cross the border.11 Refugee registration services were suspended, 
leaving thousands stranded and hundreds of asylum seekers forcibly returned by Kenyan 
authorities. Kenya again shut the border when it embarked on Operation Linda Nchi and 
stopped registration of new refugee arrivals citing security reasons.
Yet, although buffering Kenya from Al-Shabaab attacks was the official reason for Kenya’s 
military intervention, diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks lend credence to the theory 
that preparations were already set for the Operation and that the tourist abductions were 
just a trigger for the intervention. The cables showed that Kenya had lobbied for US sup-
port of the ‘Jubaland Initiative’ since 2010. This sought to establish a separate pseudo-state 
in southern Somalia, the idea being that it severs ways for Al-Shabaab to infiltrate Kenya’s 
borders by pushing the group back well into southern Somalia’s hinterlands. Kenyan forces 
would enter southern Somalia, drive away Al-Shabaab, creating a buffer zone to allow the 
Transitional Federal Government to take control and increase its capacity to retain it.
5Standard, ‘Minister Says eastleigh the next Target in the Hunt for al-Shabaab Militants’, October 20, 2011.
6david M. anderson and Jacob. McKnight, ‘Kenya at War: al-Shabaab and its enemies in eastern africa’, African Affairs 114, 
no. 454 (January 1, 2015): 1–27.
7The Star, ‘Security alert at Kenya’s border Points, Says Saitoti’, October 10, 2011.
8Jeremy lind and Jude Howell, ‘counter-Terrorism and the Politics of aid: civil Society Responses in Kenya’, Development 
and Change 41, no. 2 (March 2010): 335–53.
9Rose Jaji, ‘Somali asylum Seekers and Refoulement at the Kenya – Somalia border’, Journal of Borderlands Studies 28, no. 
3 (2013): 355–68. Page 355.
10anna lindley. "between a protracted and a crisis situation: Policy responses to Somali refugees in Kenya." Refugee Survey 
Quarterly (2011): 14–49.
11Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘bring the gun or You’ll die’, 29/6/2009, https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/06/29/bring-gun-
or-youll-die/torture-rape-and-other-serious-human-rights-violations (accessed February 17, 2014).
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The Kenyan government thought that its military involvement in the Jubaland initiative 
would have a moderating influence on the risk of further Al-Shabaab violence. Yet, attacks 
have multiplied. Seen from the perspective of Kenya’s Somali and Muslim populations that 
have been worst affected by Al-Shabaab violence in recent years, the military operation and a 
raft of other security responses in Kenya were the latest turn in a situation of persistent mar-
ginalisation, unequal citizenship and the use of state violence against minority populations.
Seeing like a state: review of Kenya’s relations with Somalia and its Somali 
population
The current relationship between Kenyan Somalis and the Kenyan state should be assessed 
in view of the longer history of state–society relations between the state and ethnic Somalis. 
The state’s position on ethnic Somalis has entangled with its approaches to domestic security 
right from Kenya’s independence in 1963. The alienation of the North Eastern Province 
(NEP), comprising the Somali-majority current-day Mandera, Wajir and Garissa counties, 
started during the early years of colonial rule. The colonial regime extended its control in 
the early twentieth century over the area that was then known as the Northern Frontier 
District (NFD). The regime enforced a form of military administration, implementing 
policies that effectively isolated the area from the rest of Kenya.12 It made no efforts for the 
socio-economic and political integration of its population.13 The colonial regime imposed 
further mobility restrictions and severed administrative control over the next few decades.14 
Political parties in NFD were banned and Somali resistance to these measures was harshly 
suppressed.
During the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference in 1962, Kenyan Somali repre-
sentatives from NFD expressed their wish to secede from Kenya and join the greater Somalia, 
which had gained Independence on 1 July 1960. The outcome of a government-inquiry by an 
Independent Commission showed that 87% of the NFD population, Somali and non-Somali 
Muslims, were in favour of secession to Somalia.15 The British government ignored this, 
however, and instead formed the NEP.
Disgruntled by the decision, the region’s Somali population boycotted the 1963 elections. 
Armed groups started an insurgency known as the ‘Shifta war’ (1963–1967), which Somalia 
covertly supported.16 The new Kenyatta government declared a state of emergency for NEP 
in December 1963 and sent military and paramilitary police units. Its counter-insurgency 
strategy included ‘forced villagisation’ of scattered communities17: an example of ‘planned 
12david M. anderson, ‘Remembering Wagalla: State Violence in northern Kenya, 1962–1991’, Journal of Eastern African 
Studies 8, no. 4 (2014): 658–76.
13Ogenga Otunnu, ‘Factors affecting the Treatment of Kenyan–Somalis and Somali Refugees in Kenya: a Historical Overview’, 
Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees 12, no. 5 (1992).
14Otunnu, op. cit.; neil carrier and Hassan H. Kochore, ‘navigating ethnicity and electoral Politics in northern Kenya: The case 
of the 2013 election’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 8, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 135–52. The regime declared the area a 
closed district in 1926. This was followed by a Special district Ordinance, requiring Somali citizens to obtain special passes 
to leave the area (Otunnu 1992). The Special districts (administration) Ordinance (1934), together with the Stock, Theft 
and Produce Ordinance (1933), gave the colonial administrators extensive powers of arrest, restraint, detention and seizure 
of properties of ‘hostile tribes’. The latter two ordinances also applied to Tana River, lamu, Kajiado and Samburu districts.
15Otunnu, op. cit.
16anderson, ‘Remembering Wagalla’.
17anderson, op. cit.
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control’ of a population.18 An estimated 4000 Somalis were killed between 1964 and 1967, 
when the insurgency was halted.19
Yet, the relationship between Kenya and Somalia continued to be tense. Post-colonial 
governments maintained forms of military administration in NEP and reinforced many of 
the legal provisions that effected its isolation.20 ‘Collective punishment’ was a key strategy 
of the military to control and discipline the population throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
Colonial policies that allowed for such measures were maintained after Independence and 
therefore security forces could operate with little oversight.21 After Somalia’s intervention 
in the Ogaden war (1978–1979) in Ethiopia, the Kenyan government feared that Somalia 
might infiltrate NEP and stepped up its military presence.22 The worst incidents occurred 
in 1980, 1984 and 1989 under President Moi.23 The Wagalla massacre in February 1984 was 
the largest collective punishment operation that took the lives of between 500 and 3000 
men from the Degodia clan.24
Later, the government launched operations to scrutinise the identity and origins of 
Kenyan Somali in NEP, in order to distinguish ‘original’ from ‘foreign’ Somalis and to 
expel the latter for security reasons. A major screening exercise carried out in 1989 under 
President Moi, with the purpose of distinguishing ‘indigenous’ Somali from ‘alien’ Somali 
refugees who had obtained Kenyan identity documents illegally, echoed Enloe’s ‘ethnic 
security maps’, laying bare the ways that state security elites profile and target minorities in 
direct contradiction of their citizenship rights.25 Kenyan Somalis were forced to demonstrate 
their membership of particular Somali lineages. The measures to verify their statements 
were highly controversial, in effect creating ‘hierarchies of citizenship’.26
Military presence in NEP remained high after the state of emergency was lifted in 1991. 
As conflict spiralled following the collapse of the state in Somalia, and the Kenyan govern-
ment expected spillover effects on its territory, Kenyan state security institutions subjected 
Somalis to surveillance and renewed screening, mistreatment and violence. Even after the 
identity requirements on Kenyan Somalis were removed in 1997, in practice, they have 
long since been subject to routine stop and searches by the police and coerced into paying 
bribes. So widespread is the practice of paying bribes to the police that Kenyan Somalis 
have referred to themselves as being ‘human ATMs’.27
18James c. Scott, Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed (Yale university 
Press, 1998).
19daniel branch, ‘Violence, decolonisation and the cold War in Kenya’s north-eastern Province, 1963–1978’, Journal of Eastern 
African Studies 8, no. 4 (2014): 642–57.
20For example, through three constitutional amendments: The third amendments vide act no.14 (1965) altered parliamentary 
majority required for approval of a declaration of a state of emergency from 65% to a simple majority. The Fourth amend-
ment vide act no. 16 (1966) extended the President's Power to rule neP by decree, extending this to the neighbouring 
Marsabit, isiolo, Tana River and lamu districts. The sixth amendment vide act no.18 (1966) enlarged the government's 
emergency powers by removing existing legislation relating to parliamentary control over emergency legislation and the 
law relating to Public order.
21anderson, ‘Remembering Wagalla’. actions were carried out with nearly complete impunity. The indemnity act (1970) pro-
tected state officials, including the army, from being hold to account for state violence. This act was only revoked in 2010.
22Otunnu, ‘Factors affecting the Treatment of Kenyan-Somalis and Somali Refugees in Kenya’.
23Otunnu, op. cit.; anderson, ‘Remembering Wagalla’.
24anderson, ‘Remembering Wagalla’. President Moi’s regime silenced any account of the massacre and persisted in denial, 
which is why only estimates exists of number of victims. campaigns for revealing the details accompanied by a truth-telling 
processes have increased since 2002.
25cynthia H. enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divides Societies (university of georgia Press, 1980).
26emma lochery, "Rendering difference visible: The Kenyan state and its Somali citizens," African Affairs (2012): 615–639.
27iPOa, ‘Monitoring Report on Operation Sanitization eastleigh Publically Known as “usalama Watch”’ (The independent 
Policing Oversight authority, 2014).
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Ethnic Somali and Kenya’s politics
President Moi (1978–2002) formulated a strategy to include Somali leaders and he integrated 
several prominent Somali leaders, primarily Ogadeni, into his government and the military. 
It was an attempt to create patronage networks between the state, the Kenyan Somali leaders 
and their constituencies, in order to address resistance amongst ethnic Somali.28 However, 
Moi’s actions fuelled ethnic politics and divisions amongst the Somali clans in NEP. Other 
Somali groups viewed the elevation of select Ogadeni as a sign of favouritism and political 
dominance by particular Somali lineages.29 Further, Somalis in government and the Kenyan 
military used their official positions to detain and deport members of rival Somali clans 
during the 1989 screening exercise.30
Dynamics in NEP indicated an integration into national politics after 2002 under 
President Mwai Kibaki’s first government with certain candidates reaching out to (segments 
of) the NEP population, against the background of intensifying ethnic politics that pitted 
Somali groups against each other. In the 2007 and 2013 elections, politicians considered NEP 
more of a swing area.31 In the run-up to the 2007 elections, Raila Odinga and his Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM) campaigned for the Muslim vote in general and for NEP 
in particular (Mahmoud 2008). It signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding with 
the newly founded National Muslim Leaders’ Forum in August 2007. ODM promised to 
give government appointments, redress marginalisation, and resolve citizenship issues. In 
response, the Kibaki government quickly appointed several Muslims to government posi-
tions and established a Presidential Special Action Committee in October 2007, including 
two prominent Somali members, which was to investigate Muslim concerns and make 
recommendations. However, the Committee’s report was not made public.
These concerns played out against the backdrop of renewed targeting of Kenyan Somalis 
and Muslims following the US-backed Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia against 
the ICU fighters in late 2006. The fall out of the military intervention saw Islamists flee to 
Kenya, in part instigating a crackdown by Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU). 
Hundreds were arrested and more than 100 renditioned to Somalia, renewing allegations 
of state security profiling and targeting of Somalis and Muslims more widely.32
In summary, the colonial regime as well as Kenya’s post-colonial governments used vari-
ous top-down strategies to establish a designed or planned social order.33 Policies restricting 
the movement of Somalis, forced villagisation in certain areas of NEP, screening exercises, 
and policies allowing for military coercion and collective punishment were all part of the 
state’s approach to systematically control a (segment of) its citizenry34. The strategies were in 
any event unsuccessful and opposed through Somali mobilisation, both through democratic 
28godwin R. Murunga, ‘Refugees at Home? coping with Somalia conflict in nairobi, Kenya’, African Studies From Below.
(CODESRIA Book Series, Dakar) (2009): 198–232.
29anderson, ‘Remembering Wagalla’; lochery, ‘Rendering difference visible’.
30lochery, op. cit.
31neil carrier and Hassan H. Kochore, ‘navigating ethnicity and electoral Politics in northern Kenya: The case of the 2013 
election’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 8, no. 1 (2014): 135–52.
32beth elise Whitaker, ‘Reluctant Partners: Fighting Terrorism and Promoting democracy in Kenya’, International Studies 
Perspectives 9, no. 3 (august 2008): 254–71; Jeremy lind and Jude Howell, ‘counter-Terrorism and the Politics of aid: civil 
Society Responses in Kenya’, Development and Change 41, no. 2 (March 2010): 335–53.
33Scott, ‘Seeing like a State’.
34Francis b. nyamnjoh, Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern Africa, africa in the 
new Millennium (dakar: codesria books, 2006). There are parallels with other political contexts in southern africa where 
certain population groups, particularly from immigrant backgrounds, are socially constructed as ‘outsiders’, legitimating 
the construction of unequal citizenship regimes for ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.
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means and through informal resistance. Yet, in the process of pursuing strategies to restrict, 
police and otherwise control Somalis, the state attempted to forge a Somali identity ‘from 
above’35 and imagined – and presented – it as a largely criminal identity and security threat. 
The social construction of Somalis as a threatening presence has become imprinted in the 
state’s security thinking, justifying new security responses to recent Al-Shabaab violence. 
As the following sections explore, these responses, building on the construction of Somali 
and Muslim citizens as a threat, have diminished public attitudes of the state and hardened 
vernacular outlooks on security, providing ready fodder for Al-Shabaab’s campaign.
Al-Shabaab in Kenya and the home-grown threat
Although ostensibly launched to enhance domestic security, the scope, scale and audacity of 
Al-Shabaab attacks have worsened since Operation Linda Nchi. What began as low-profile 
grenade attacks on citizens and then assassinations of police, religious and business figures 
has morphed into a far more threatening pattern of insecurity that is destabilising a wide 
area of Kenya’s north-eastern and coastal counties. Al-Shabaab violence in Kenya made 
international headlines when militants attacked Nairobi’s Westgate shopping centre, killing 
67 people. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the June 2014 massacre in Mpeketoni in 
Lamu County that left 60 dead. Weeks later, new raids on the 5th of July in Lamu and Tana 
River counties left over 20 dead. As before in the Mpeketoni attack, a heavily armed group 
came during the night, striking the local police station, torching homes and businesses 
while targeting men on a killing spree that was rumoured to last for hours. In April 2015, 
Al-Shabaab militants launched a pre-dawn attack of Garissa University College, killing 148.
35Murunga, ‘Refugees at Home?’
Figure 1.  Percentage of all non-state violence attributed to al-Shabaab in north-eastern and coastal 
counties (2005–2015).
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According to the Armed Conflict Location Event Database (ACLED), 206 attacks 
occurred between 16 October 2011 (the start of Operation Linda Nchi) and the end of 
2015, with 839 reported fatalities over this period. Further, the highest number of fatalities 
were recorded in 2014 (290) and 2015 (276), indicating the effectiveness of the organisation’s 
strategy to exploit internal tensions in Kenya to promote the spread of violence. The locus 
of attacks remains Kenya’s north-east and coastal counties.36 In these areas, Al-Shabaab 
was linked to less than 10 % of all incidences of violence recorded in 2008. This jumped to 
nearly 40% in 2011, dipping in 2013 when levels of violence around the elections spiked 
(drowning out attacks involving Al-Shabaab), before rising to 59% in 2015 (Figure 1).37
Observers note that responsibility for the attacks can be divided between those directed 
by Al-Shabaab’s command structure in Somalia, by terrorist cells in Kenya, and by crimi-
nal organisations intent on exploiting the situation of insecurity in pursuit of political and 
business agendas.38 Some differentiate between Al-Shabaab and extremists of various stripes 
who deploy the organisation’s violent tactics in pursuit of a range of aims:
The Al-Shabaab threat level is high but this is mostly from Al-Shabaab sympathisers. They 
are taking advantage of the current insecurity to cause mayhem … Note that I call them sym-
pathisers and not Al-Shabaab because I think they do not believe in the ideology, only in the 
tactics they use.39
The incidence of copycat attacks or vendetta veiled by other violence is an important development 
that points to the enmeshing of Al-Shabaab with local politics and vernacular understandings of 
security. The greatest threat from Al-Shabaab is how it relates to and reinforces tensions precip-
itated by Kenya’s domestic policies, politics and practices, particularly as they relate to uneven 
development patterns and the treatment of its Muslim populations. Whilst radicalisation is not 
a new phenomenon in Kenya, the challenge deepens in a context of a resurgent Al-Shabaab. The 
group’s recruitment in Kenya can be traced back to its origins in 2006 following the demise of 
the ICU.40 Al-Shabaab has also recruited former fighters belonging to a 2,500-men strong militia 
of Kenyan Somalis and refugees that Kenya mobilised and trained to fight in Somalia.41 Many 
deserted and returned to Kenya after facing the reality of warfare in southern Somalia. Others 
remained in Somalia, later joining forces that seized control of Kismayo port, whilst others were 
recruited by Al-Shabaab. Kenya media reports note that fighters who have returned have quietly 
slipped back to Kenya with little or no support to demobilise and reintegrate.42 A human rights 
official familiar with the militia explained:
A lot of local boys were recruited. Initially the idea was to use Kenyan Somalis. But then locals 
were recruited in Isiolo, Lamu and Garissa. They were trained by the KDF. But the posting 
was not properly managed, so many returned. In Mandera in 2012, 600 Garre had returned. 
The government knows these people but nothing was done to demobilise them. So part of the 
36a region defined here to include Mandera, Wajir, garissa, lamu, Kilifi, Mombasa and Kwale counties.
37acled data is coded from public sources; thus, attacks documented in confidential reports such as by security and intelli-
gence agencies is not captured. Further, Figure 1 does not include unattributed attacks (i.e. those that are not claimed or 
attributed to al-Shabaab). For these reasons the data presented in Figure 1 likely under-estimates the number of actual 
attacks carried out by al-Shabaab.
38abdullahi boru Halakhe, ‘To Prevent More Mpeketonis Kenya Must define Somalia exit Plan’, African Arguments Blog, 
June 19, 2014.
39interview with Kenyan government official, July 7, 2014.
40interview with Kenyan Muslim leader, July 4, 2014.
41Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Welcome to Kenya. Police abuse of Somali Refugees’, 17/06/2010. www.hrw.org/
reports/2010/06/17/welcome-kenya-0 (accessed February 17, 2014); international crisis group (icg), ‘Kenya: al-Shabaab 
– closer to Home’. 102, 2014.
42‘How Poverty and Search for identity drive Youth into Terrorism’, Sunday Nation, august 10, 2014.
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problem was failures of the government to properly deal with it, and they come back to haunt 
the state … The youth will tell you that they were trained from 8 months to 2 years, and how 
much they were paid.43
Further, the 2011 UN Monitoring Group Report on Somalia singles out the Muslim Youth 
Centre (MYC) at Pumwani Riyadha Mosque in Nairobi as a recruitment and training centre for 
would-be Al-Shabaab fighters.44 One of the MYC officials named in the UN report was picked 
to head Al-Shabaab’s Kenya operations.45 The MYC later emerged as Al-Hijra in 2012. Yet a year 
before then Al-Shabaab had around 500 Kenyans in the ranks of its mujahidin, most of whom 
were not recruited or trained by MYC or Al-Hijra. As the Kenyan government tightened reg-
ulatory controls on mosques and madrassas, recruitment became more diffuse and difficult to 
track. For example, entertainment halls, such as where young people watch European football 
matches, were targeted by recruiters in places like Garissa and Isiolo. Further, activist Salafi-jihadi 
clerics used websites and social media to spread their ideology amongst the Muslim faithful, 
enlisting new recruits who were on the whole Sufi (not Salafist). The magazine Gaidi Mtaani as 
well as videos such as ‘Mujahideen Moments’ feature Swahili-speaking Kenyan militants who 
emphasise themes such as the humiliation suffered by Muslims in Kenya, Christian ‘occupation’ 
of coastal land, revenge for the killing of prominent preachers, and the liberating potential of 
violence.46 Kenyan and foreign intelligence services have alleged associations between Salafi-
jihadi clerics and Al-Shabaab. Since 2012, a ‘“dirty-war” of tit-for-tat killings’ has escalated in 
the coastal counties of Mombasa and Kilifi but also in Nairobi,47 implicating Kenyan security 
agencies in murderous, covert counter-terrorism operations, as explored below.
The June 2014 massacre in Mpeketoni in coastal Lamu County epitomises the evolving 
dynamic of Kenya’s violent insecurity. Survivors and witnesses described the attackers as 
being a mix of Somalis, Arabs, English-speaking and local (Mijikenda) people. Many of the 
attackers spoke Kiswahili, with one local resident telling a Kenyan reporter, ‘These people 
knew people by their names’.48 Al-Shabaab’s intent to recruit non-Somali Kenyans is evident 
in the fact that suspects in several past attacks were from the Mt. Kenya region and western 
highlands. For example, a July 2014 report of Kenya’s National Intelligence Service copied to 
all police stations in Coastal counties identified Idris Kamau, a Kenyan of Kikuyu ethnicity, 
as the mastermind of the spate of terror attacks in Lamu and Tana River Counties in June and 
July.49 A report into the Westgate attack tabled by a Joint Parliamentary Committee reported:
Certain segments of Kenya’s Muslim youth are becoming more and more at a risk of radical-
ization and recruitment into extremist groups for various reasons. This is visible because it 
is not Somali nationals behind most of the terrorist incidents outside Somalia’s borders but 
Kenyan nationals. Though Somalia provides a safe haven, training camps and opportunities 
for extremists to fight the ‘enemies of Islam’, al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab have executed attacks 
in the region by relying on Kenyan youth assistance and support. The Government should 
therefore strive for strategies that address the youth radicalization.50
43interview with Kenyan researcher, July 2, 2014.
44un Monitoring group, ‘Report of the Monitoring group on Somalia Pursuant to Security council Resolution 1916 of 2010’, 
18/07/2011. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1869.pdf (accessed March 6, 2014).
45‘Kenyan Takes charge of local al-Shabaab Wing’, Standard, January 17, 2012.
46‘Kenya at the Precipice: al-Shabaab and the coast crisis’, Daily Nation, July 18, 2014.
47international crisis group (icg), ‘al-Shabaab – closer to Home’, 10.
48‘Kenyan converts Return to Take charge of jihadist killings’, Standard, July 19, 2014.
49‘Police unveil names behind coast killings’, Standard, July 12, 2014.
50Kenya national assembly, ‘Report of the Joint committee on administration and national Security and defence and Foreign 
Relations on the inquiry into the Westgate Terrorist attack, and Other Terror attacks in Mandera in north-eastern and Kilifi 
in the coastal Region’, Republic of Kenya (2013), 16.
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While awareness is growing of the need to address the problem of young people being drawn 
to extremist organisations, policy discussions tend to reify ‘radicalisation’, when in fact, it is 
a compound phenomenon with many disparate antecedents.51 Ideology is part of the rad-
icalisation story in Kenya. Observers trace the radicalisation of Kenya’s young Muslims in 
part to the deepening influence of Wahhabism, an orientation of Salafism that informs much 
of the core theological outlook of Jihadi groups like Al Qaeda and Al-Shabaab.52 Wahhabi 
influences can be traced back to the 1970s but really took root in Kenya throughout the 
1990s through the work of Saudi-funded charitable organisations like Al-Haramain and the 
Young Muslim Association, who laid a foundational network of madrassas and orphanages 
in northern Kenya and the Coast. Many madrassa graduates received scholarships to study 
in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan amongst other places and they returned to Kenya, where they set 
up other madrassas and charities.53 Matters came to a turn in 2006, when many madrassa 
teachers and students travelled to Somalia to fight alongside the ICU.
Yet, more than ideology, uneven socio-economic development and the historic mar-
ginalisation of some Kenyan populations has fuelled extremist leanings, as the following 
quotes highlight:
In Lamu there are historical injustices. Mzee Kenyatta created an avenue for his own people 
to displace the indigenous in Lamu. During the Kibaki era, the Kikuyu got an upper hand. 
They got access to financial institutions and infrastructure. This has created a huge division … 
With Al-Shabaab now coming across the border, and the injustices present at the Coast, the 
resources that are available, people want a hand. Al-Shabaab is recruiting off of Swahili land 
grievances, it is arming them, giving them an ideology that “your land has been taken away’.54
I think 50% of attacks are carried out by local jihadi groups in northern Kenya and the Coast. 
Al-Shabaab is basically instrumentalising grievances. It’s work is much easier, it realises. It 
doesn’t even need to use its own resources. This is a very conducive territory for them to 
operate – to seek shelter, hide, and find individuals who sympathise with their aim of desta-
bilising the state.55
In a similar vein, Anderson and McKnight identify the risk of Al-Shabaab evolving into a 
domestic insurgency at Kenya’s margins, ‘Al-Shabaab is likely to exploit the deeply rooted 
disaffection amongst the peoples of the Kenya coast and north-east in gaining recruits to 
its banner. These affiliates may only see Al-Shabaab’s black standard as a temporary flag of 
convenience, but that may be enough to incubate and evolve an Al-Shabaab-led insurgency 
within Kenya’.56
That far more complex dynamics are at play in recent violence than infiltration by 
Al-Shabaab operatives came to the fore during the June and July 2014 attacks in Lamu and 
Tana River Counties. Claiming responsibility for the first attack in Mpeketoni, Al-Shabaab 
proved deft at weaving together local grievances as well as regional cleavages. A state-
ment explained why the insurgents raided Mpeketoni – a settlement scheme established 
in the 1960s for Gikuyu from the central highlands – because ‘it was originally a Muslim 
51anneli botha, ‘Political Socialization and Terrorist Radicalization among individuals Who Joined al-Shabaab in Kenya’, Studies 
in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 11 (2014): 895–919.
52international crisis group (icg), ‘al-Shabaab – closer to Home’, 8.
53Ibid.
54interview with Kenyan-Somali professional, July 9, 2014.
55interview with Kenyan journalist. July 2, 2014.
56anderson and McKnight, ‘Kenya at War’, 3.
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town before it was invaded and occupied by Christian settlers’,57 adding that the attack was 
‘revenge for the presence of Kenyan troops in Somalia and the killing of Muslims’.58
Weeks later, new raids on 5 July on the settlements of Hindi in Lamu and Gamba in Tana 
River left over 20 dead. Less than a day after the raids, Deputy Inspector General of the 
Police, Grace Kaindi, claimed in a press briefing that the outlawed Mombasa Republican 
Council (MRC) was behind the attacks. This was despite a broadcast on an Al-Shabaab-
affiliated radio station which stated that it was responsible for the Hindi attack (no group 
immediately came forward to claim responsibility for the Gamba attack). Explaining the 
police thinking, Kaindi revealed that a board was placed at a road junction, with the fol-
lowing message scrawled in chalk:
Raila Tosha (Raila is enough, the one who should lead)
MRC munalala (MRC is sleeping)
Waislamu Ardizenu (Muslims, it’s your land)
Sina nyakuliwa (Your land is being taken away)
Amkeni mupigane (Wake up and fight)
you invade Muslim county
and you want to stay in peace
Kick Christians out Coast
Uhuru down’
The attacks in Lamu and Tana River – more than retribution for Kenya’s military opera-
tion in southern Somalia – exposed Al-Shabaab’s efforts to square long-standing marginali-
sation and historic injustices in Kenya’s coastal areas with the organisation’s regional jihadist 
agenda. They revealed the ease with which Al-Shabaab could exploit simmering sectarian 
divisions and local political disputes through providing arms, other tactical support, salaries 
for fighters, as well as an ideological edifice on which deeply held grievances could hang. 
Thus, the threat of Al-Shabaab was and remains its competences and capacities to exploit 
internal stresses in Kenya apparent in inequalities in citizenship and development, the use 
of state violence and targeting of Somalis and Muslims in state security practices.
Kenya’s security responses to Al-Shabaab violence
Whilst Al-Shabaab has grounded its Kenya campaign in the country’s internal tensions 
and divisions, Kenya’s state security responses are conditioned by a logic that Al-Shabaab 
violence is an external stress that can be suppressed and contained. These responses, includ-
ing Operation Linda Nchi, have only encouraged the Al-Shabaab threat to grow, whilst 
undermining the security of Somalis and Muslims.
Increased policing of Muslim communities
Kenya’s wider strategy to prevent Al-Shabaab attacks involves measures to identify and 
remove individuals who are in the country illegally, continuing a form of ‘ethnic security 
mapping’ and profiling seen during the Shifta conflict and up through the 1990s. In April 
2014, Kenya’s Internal Security Minister launched Operation Usalama Watch (Operation 
Peace Watch) to remove individuals – mainly Somalis – who were in the country illegally 
57‘al-Shabaab changes Tack to directly Take on KdF in lamu’. East African, July 26, 2014.
58‘Kenya attacks: al-Shabab Raid Village near Mpeketoni’, BBC News, June 17, 2014.
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and believed to be behind the attacks. Over 6,000 police officers and soldiers deployed in 
Nairobi’s Eastleigh neighbourhood. Detainees were incarcerated at police stations through-
out Nairobi, as well as in the city’s Kasarani sports stadium, where they were screened by 
officials from the National Registration Bureau and Department of Refugee Affairs. Some 
82 were deported to Mogadishu, including children and UNHCR-registered refugees whilst 
others were sent to refugee camps.59 However, others languished in custody months after 
being detained because the state had failed to provide funds to transport them back to 
Somalia.60
Kenya’s Somali and Muslim leadership strongly criticised Usalama Watch, which some 
likened to a ‘state-led profiling of the Kenya-Somali community’.61 Echoing this, a Kenyan 
Muslim leader remarked: ‘Somalis are being harassed all the time. It is no longer a security 
issue but one of extortion and it does not matter if one has a document. The police are on 
the spot saying our IDs are fake but it becomes genuine when one pays the money’.62 A 
fact finding mission by the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) found that 
police personnel failed to observe human rights protections and demanded bribes from 
the detainees ranging between 1000 and 20,000 Ksh.63
Extended and indefinite curfews were also imposed in a number of north-eastern coun-
ties, including Garissa, Wajir, Mandera and Tana River. Police and Kenyan military service 
personnel are alleged to have exploited the curfew to extort and harass residents if they were 
not carrying their government-issued identity cards. One Mandera resident commented, 
‘Many of the people who are arrested and cannot pay are taken into custody are accused of 
having ties with the Al-Shabaab’.64
Rather than providing protection, state security practices like Usalama Watch, deploy-
ment of military in the marginal frontiers and extended curfews are modelled on the 
assumption that these populations threaten Kenya’s peace and security. Yet, Kenyan Somalis 
and Muslims also feel exposed and deeply vulnerable to terrorist violence, as a Muslim 
leader commented, ‘We met with the President … We told him that Usalama Watch is a 
bad operation that will not work and you cannot hold people in a camp without charge. 
We gave him proposals on what needs to be done including strengthening the National 
Intelligence Service, and employing Muslim members to infiltrate the community and stop 
making Muslims feel like suspects yet we are also targets’.65
Extra-judicial killings
Kenya’s security forces have been accused of being behind a wave of assassinations and 
forceful disappearances of ordinary Muslims, businessmen, traders, clerics and activists. The 
state-funded Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) has accused security 
agencies of being behind the extrajudicial killings of 25 people and enforced disappearances 
of 81 others during counterterrorism operations.66 Human Rights Watch documented at 
59iPOa, ‘Monitoring Report on Operation Sanitization eastleigh Publically Known as “usalama Watch”’.
60‘illegal Visitors Still Held 4 Months later’, The Star, august 11, 2014.
61boru Halakhe, ‘To Prevent More Mpeketonis Kenya Must define Somalia exit Plan’.
62interview with Kenyan Muslim leader. July 4, 2014.
63‘29 Police Officers Probed for abuses’, Daily Nation, July 14, 2014.
64interview with resident. 21 March 2016.
65interview with resident.
66Kenya national commission on Human Rights, ‘The error of Fighting Terror with Terror’, September 15, 2015.
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least 34 cases of disappearances between 2014–2016 in Nairobi and in north-eastern Kenya, 
alleging the involvement of the Anti-Terrorism Policing Unit (ATPU) and KDF in the 
disappearances.67 There has been no conclusive investigations resulting in arrests and the 
prosecution of the killers or those who have paid them. The government has also denied 
its security forces are responsible for the disappearances and killings.
Failure to hold any one to account has deepened mistrust and tension between security 
agencies and Muslims. Lack of accountability has led to conclusions that security personnel 
resort to extrajudicial killings of suspects because of existing failures to gather evidence and 
secure witnesses to testify in court.68 A Kenyan researcher who has investigated the kill-
ings explained, ‘The state response (to the threat of attacks) has been abusive and extreme. 
Excessive and unnecessary force is used. The investigative capacity of the police is weak; 
the state has not been able to present strong cases that can withstand rigorous scrutiny in 
courts. Because it fails to convict these people, it instead reverts to targeted killing’.69
Crackdown on refugees
Over the years, Kenyan politicians and government officials have blamed insecurity on, and 
attributed specific attacks to, the country’s refugee population, which the UN estimates is 
over 80% Somali (UNHCR, 2016).70 As Al-Shabaab attacks worsened since 2011, political 
leaders have on several occasions singled out Dadaab as a concern, allegedly because it 
provides a haven for Al-Shabaab to take cover and seek recruits. In December 2013, the 
Kenyan government reached a ‘voluntary repatriation’ agreement with the UNHCR and the 
federal government of Somalia. In March 2014, Kenya’s then Interior Minister, Joseph Ole 
Lenku, ordered all refugees residing outside Dadaab and Kakuma (Kenya’s other UNHCR-
operated camp for refugees) to immediately return to the camps where they are officially 
registered. The directive further ordered the immediate shutting of all refugee registration 
centres in urban areas including Nairobi.
Up to September 2016, a total of 30,731 Somali refugees from Dadaab went through the 
voluntary return process; of these, 24,630 returned in 2016 alone as the process accelerated 
under pressure from Kenyan authorities. In May 2016, the Kenyan government announced 
plans to close the Dadaab camps within a year and to repatriate hundreds of thousands of 
Somalis. Announcing the closure, Kenya’s Interior Minister Joseph Nkaissery stated, ‘For 
reasons of pressing national security that speak to the safety of Kenyans in a context of 
terrorist and criminal activities, the government of the Republic of Kenya has commenced 
the exercise of closing Dadaab refugee complex’.71 At the same time, the government also 
moved to disband the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA), which had been tasked with 
registering and managing the refugee population. By evoking security threats and the risk 
of further Al-Shabaab attacks, the government won domestic political support for its plans 
to close Dadaab. Others saw the move as an attempt by Kenya’s government to win greater 
67Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘deaths and disappearances: abuses in counterterrorism Operations in nairobi and in 
northeastern Kenya’, 19/07/2016. https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/19/deaths-and-disappearances/abuses-coun-
terterrorism-operations-nairobi-and (accessed September 5, 2016).
68Open Society Foundations, ‘We’re tired of taking you to the court’: Human rights abuses by Kenya’s anti-Terrorism Police 
unit’, 2013, 47.
69interview with Kenyan researcher. July 2nd 2014.
70united nations High commissioner for Refugees (unHcR), ‘Kenya comprehensive Refugee Programme 2016: Programming 
for Solutions’, 2016.
71‘Kenya Says it Will Shut World’s biggest Refugee camp at dadaab’, The Guardian, May 11, 2016.
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international assistance for hosting refugees.72 After the United States pledged millions to 
support refugee operations in Kenya, Nkaissery announced a softening of plans to close the 
camp, which were postponed until Somalia stabilises. Regardless, Kenya’s political leaders 
still pressed the case that the camps posed a security threat. For example, three female 
attackers shot dead whilst attempting to detonate explosives at Mombasa central police 
station in September 2016 were alleged to have Dadaab connections. Speaking after the 
foiled attack, Foreign Affairs Minister Amina Mohamed told media, ‘We are doing this 
[closing Dadaab] because of our own security. Let’s close the camps and see what happens. 
We’ll then see if the evidence we have presented was concrete or not’.73
Security laws amendments
The Kenyan government has pushed for a number of changes in security architecture that 
seek to consolidate security powers around the Executive. In December 2014, parliament 
passed a hastily drafted Security Laws (Amendment) Bill 2014 which President Kenyatta 
said ‘gives security actors a firm institutional framework for coherent cooperation and 
synergy’. The bill was strongly opposed by the opposition CORD coalition as well as civil 
society groups who argued that it violated the constitution and was an affront to the bill 
of rights. Following a petition by CORD and the Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights (KNCHR), the High Court nullified application of eight sections of the Act saying 
they raised concerns over human rights, a ruling that was upheld by the Court of Appeal.74 
The nullified sections included a requirement to seek police permission before publishing 
images of terrorism victims. Sections imposing jail terms of up to three years and hefty fines 
for reports deemed to undermine police investigations on terrorism were also suspended. 
Section 20 of the Act which amended the criminal procedure code was declared uncon-
stitutional for being in conflict with the right to be released on bond or bail on reasonable 
conditions.
The Security Laws (Amendment) Bill reflected internal power struggles and personal 
differences amongst security bosses over the distribution of security powers as well as 
President Uhuru Kenyatta’s attempts to roll-back reforms that followed Kenya’s 2010 con-
stitution. Yet, it is questionable the reforms will do anything to address lapses in Kenya’s 
internal security. These include weak coordination and poor relations between intelligence 
and policing departments, which have been blamed for the failure of security agencies to 
prevent several attacks in recent years. Prior to the Westgate attack, the National Security 
Council, chaired by the President, was told of plans to attack key buildings in Mombasa 
and Nairobi between 13 and 20 September and concerns were also raised with the National 
Security Advisory Committee, which prepares intelligence briefings for the NSC.75 At the 
time, the Israeli Embassy in Nairobi raised concern that Israeli and Jewish business inter-
ests – including Westgate – could be targeted during the Jewish holidays in September. The 
intelligence was not acted upon. Further, police ignored five intelligence reports issued 
72‘Refugees Shouldn’t be bargaining chips’, ben Rawlence, New York Times, May 17, 2016. http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/05/17/opinion/refugees-shouldnt-be-bargaining-chips.html (accessed October 11, 2016).
73‘Women Killed in Mombasa Police Station attack Had dadaab camp links – amina’, The Star, September 21, 2016.
74Republic of Kenya, ‘Petition no. 628 of 2014’.
75‘did Karangi, Ministers ignore Terror Warning?’ Daily Nation, September 27, 2014.
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before the Garissa University attack, including one issued just 24 h before the ambush.76 
A report by the National Assembly’s Committee on Administration and National Security 
found that the attack would have been thwarted had the police acted on the intelligence.77 
The National Intelligence Service is said to have warned of the attacks in Mpeketoni and 
Maporomoko three days prior to the massacre, but the warning was not acted on by local 
security chiefs and the police. The message was also reportedly passed on to the Lamu 
County security and intelligence committee.78 A report by Independent Policing Oversight 
Authority found that the security operation following the massacre was chaotic because 
different units of the police could not agree on a joint counter-offensive, giving the fleeing 
assailants room to carry out a second attack.
Conclusion
Networked, transnational forms of violence pose a significant threat to peace and security 
in a number of sub-Saharan African countries. Governments reason that external stresses – 
including the spillovers of conflict and political disorder in neighbouring countries, or 
international terrorist and criminal networks – are to blame. Such thinking is evident in state 
security responses that are shaped by a perceived need to stamp out and contain such threats. 
The spread of violence involving Al-Shabaab in Kenya highlights the limitations of this 
analysis and the need to engage with vernacular understandings of security. Kenya’s security 
responses to Al-Shabaab violence fit a long pattern in how the state responds to perceived 
external stresses on its peace and security. Kenya, like other SSA countries experiencing 
violence by militant Islamist groups, is not overwhelmed by external, transnational 
dynamics. Rather, this article shows that it is the entwining and mutual reinforcement of 
internal and external stresses through transnational actors and processes that threaten its 
peace and security. In Kenya, internal stress relating to state-led planning of social order 
built on unequal citizenships and the use of state violence, enmesh with the external threat of 
Al-Shabaab, producing the conditions for insurgency and violence to spread at the margins. 
State security responses, informed by a logic that ‘others’ Somalis in particular, as well as 
Muslims and other minority groups, as threatening, reinforces vernacular understandings 
of marginal populations that the state itself contributes to their insecurity and undermines 
opportunities for building peace. As one Kenyan-Somali put it, state security responses 
targeting Somalis compare to ‘killing a mosquito with a hammer’, a form of collective 
punishment that drives a deeper wedge between Somalis and the state.79
The threat to Kenya’s peace and security is intimately tied up with the legacies of ear-
lier state violence and marginalisation of certain regions and populations, particularly 
Somalis and other coastal populations. Stirring anxiety and fear in Kenya is integral to 
how Al-Shabaab seeks to advance its regional ambitions in the Horn of Africa. Whilst 
Al-Shabaab remains a considerable threat to regional peace and security, the aftermath of 
its attacks in Kenya show that the organisation’s greatest impact is to unmask the country’s 
76Kenya national assembly, ‘Report of the committee on its investigations into the garissa university college Terrorist attack’, 
Republic of Kenya, 2015.
77‘Kenya “ignored garissa university Raid intelligence”’. BBC News, april 30, 2015.
78‘Spy agency Warning on attack Was ignored’, Daily Nation, June 17, 2014; ‘uhuru blames Massacre on Tribalism, Hate 
Politics’, Daily Nation, June 17, 2014.
79interview with Kenyan Somali professional. July 2, 2014.
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deep divisions. With minimal resources, it has crawled under the skin of Kenya’s domestic 
politics, deftly picking at regional and ethnic divisions as well as exploiting the existence of 
longitudinal continuities in how the state crafts a social and political order that marginalises 
many, diverse areas and populations. Deeply seated injustices and a sense of marginalisation 
amongst Kenya’s many minority ethnic and religious groups have provided fertile ground 
for Al-Shabaab to localise its Jihad at Kenya’s margins. Seen from the perspective of security 
in the vernacular, the current threat to peace and security arises from a longer trajectory 
of state–society relations rather than as something solely external connected to the advent 
of transnational Islamist militancy.
The implication of this analysis for peacebuilding and stemming Al-Shabaab attacks in 
Kenya is to understand how violence and security are seen and experienced at the mar-
gins. The legitimate needs of Kenya’s citizens intimidated by Al-Shabaab violence, whilst 
providing support for state interventions, contrasts with the largely ineffective and outright 
counter-productive targeting of Somalis seen in Operation Usalama Watch. Further, it has 
diminished the security of Kenya’s Somali and Muslim populations that have been most 
exposed to Al-Shabaab attacks. Still, the uncomfortable reality is that there has been some 
public support for security crack-downs, and initially for Operation Linda Nchi, as well. 
The ‘securitisation of the Somali presence’ affects the attitudes towards Somalis in everyday 
life,80 revealing that the sense of being a ‘marginalised identity’81 does not stem from state 
interventions alone. Equal citizenship is as much about state–society relations as it is about 
citizen–society relations. Guaranteeing equal citizenship rights for all Kenyans, following 
through on police reforms, and ensuring accountability in state security practices are fun-
damental parts of a wider peacebuilding approach that could heal both state–society and 
citizen–society tensions and reduce the Al-Shabaab threat. However, for the moment, a 
lack of political will, combined with existing levels of public support for a harder security 
approach, presage further violence at the margins.
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